TY - GEN
T1 - Acoustics to the rescue
T2 - 30th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2021
AU - Ramesh, Soundarya
AU - Xiao, Rui
AU - Maiti, Anindya
AU - Lee, Jong Taek
AU - Ramprasad, Harini
AU - Kumar, Ananda
AU - Jadliwala, Murtuza
AU - Han, Jun
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 by The USENIX Association. All rights reserved.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Lock picking and key bumping are the most common attacks on traditional pin tumbler door locks. However, these approaches require physical access to the lock throughout the attack, increasing suspicion and chances of the attacker getting caught. To overcome this challenge, we propose Keynergy, a stealthy offline attack that infers key bittings (or secret) by substantially extending and improving prior work that only utilizes a still image of the key. Keynergy effectively utilizes the inherent audible “clicks” due to a victim's key insertion, together with video footage of the victim holding the key, in order to infer the victim's key's bittings. We evaluate Keynergy via a proof-of-concept implementation and real-world experiments comprising of participants that perform multiple key insertions across a total of 75 keys with the related audio recorded using different microphone types placed at varying distances. We demonstrate that Keynergy achieves an average reduction rate of around 75% with an acoustics-based approach alone. When we combine both acoustics and video together, Keynergy obtains a reduced keyspace below ten keys for 8% of the keys (i.e., six keys out of 75 keys tested).
AB - Lock picking and key bumping are the most common attacks on traditional pin tumbler door locks. However, these approaches require physical access to the lock throughout the attack, increasing suspicion and chances of the attacker getting caught. To overcome this challenge, we propose Keynergy, a stealthy offline attack that infers key bittings (or secret) by substantially extending and improving prior work that only utilizes a still image of the key. Keynergy effectively utilizes the inherent audible “clicks” due to a victim's key insertion, together with video footage of the victim holding the key, in order to infer the victim's key's bittings. We evaluate Keynergy via a proof-of-concept implementation and real-world experiments comprising of participants that perform multiple key insertions across a total of 75 keys with the related audio recorded using different microphone types placed at varying distances. We demonstrate that Keynergy achieves an average reduction rate of around 75% with an acoustics-based approach alone. When we combine both acoustics and video together, Keynergy obtains a reduced keyspace below ten keys for 8% of the keys (i.e., six keys out of 75 keys tested).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85114474917&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85114474917
T3 - Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium
SP - 3255
EP - 3272
BT - Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium
PB - USENIX Association
Y2 - 11 August 2021 through 13 August 2021
ER -