Dworkin's paradox

Seung Ki Baek; Jung Kyoo Choi; Beom Jun Kim

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038529

Dworkin's paradox

Seung Ki Baek, Jung Kyoo Choi, Beom Jun Kim

School of Economics and Trade

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

How to distribute welfare in a society is a key issue in the subject of distributional justice, which is deeply involved with notions of fairness. Following a thought experiment by Dworkin, this work considers a society of individuals with different preferences on the welfare distribution and an official to mediate the coordination among them. Based on a simple assumption that an individual's welfare is proportional to how her preference is fulfilled by the actual distribution, we show that an egalitarian preference is a strict Nash equilibrium and can be favorable even in certain inhomogeneous situations. These suggest how communication can encourage and secure a notion of fairness.

Original language	English
Article number	e38529
Journal	PLoS ONE
Volume	7
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0038529
State	Published - 26 Jun 2012

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Dworkin's paradox

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